

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 00883 010942Z

15

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 NEA-11 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /166 W
----- 032875

R 010904Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1449

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 0883

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF 31
JANUARY 1974, MEETING BETWEEN DANISH REP KNOX AND SOVIET
DEP REP SMIRNOVSKY.

DANISH DEP RE TILLISCH CIRCULATED TO AD HOC GROUP MEMO
ON MEETING BETWEEN DANISH REP KNOX AND SOVIET DEP REP
SMIRNOVSKY WHO HAD REQUESTED IT. DANISH DEP REP NOTED
THAT SOVIET CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE NON-REDUCTION OF BUNDES-
WEHR APPEARED PARAMOUNT AND THAT THEREFORE A COMMON
CEILING WITHOUT NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS WAS UNSATISFACTORY TO
THEM. SOVIET INTEREST, HOWEVER, IN CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS
APPEARED GENUINE.
BEGIN TEXT.

1. AT HIS REQUEST AMBASSADOR SMIRNOVSKY CALLED YESTERDAY
AT 3 P.M. ON THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE. SMIRNOVSKY WAS ALONE,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 00883 010942Z

BUT ACCEPTED PRESENCE OF DANISH DEP.REP. THE CONVERSATION

LASTED FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR.

2. A MAJOR PART OF THE CONVERSATION WAS TAKEN UP BY GOING THROUGH THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WITH THE USUAL ARGUMENTS BEING ADVANCED FROM BOTH SIDES ON THE MERITS AND DEFAULTS OF THE RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS.

3. WHEN DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF DISPARITY SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE FIGURES WE HAD PRESENTED WERE INCORRECT, AND HE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD PUBLISHED DIFFERENT FIGURES ELSEWHERE. HE DIDN'T ADVANCE ANY FIGURES OF HIS OWN.

4. AS TO REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND AIR FORCES SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL OF SOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD PROBABLY NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO EITHER SIDE, BUT AN AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT COMPRISE THOSE WEAPONS WOULD BE SURE TO MEET WITH CRITICISM AND QUESTIONING FROM THE PUBLIC IN OUR COUNTRIES. HE DIDN'T GIVE MUCH FOR THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES THAT THEY COULD BE BROUGHT BACK INTO THE AREA QUICKLY - THAT WOULD BE THE CASE FOR BOTH SIDES. WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO DO HERE IN VIENNA WAS TO CREATE A SITUATION AND A CLIMATE WHERE IT WOULDN'T BE NECESSARY TO RETURN FORCES TO THE AREA.

5. AS TO THE TWO-PHASED APPROACH SMIRNOVSKY STRESSED THAT THEIR SIDE HAD GROWING DOUBTS AS TO THE INTENSIONS OF CERTAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PHASE 2-REDUCTIONS. THEY HAD NOTED A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE OF THESE COUNTRIES WHICH WORRIED THEM AND THEY WERE LOOKING FOR SOME GUARANTEES THAT THERE WOULD BE REDUCTIONS OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE 2, AND ESPECIALLY OF THE BUNDESWEHR.

6. THEY ALSO HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RESERVATION MADE BY THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT NO AGREEMENT SHOULD IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN UNION. IT WAS ILLOGICAL THAT WE ASKED FOR SUBCEILINGS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES - WHY NOT ALSO AT LEAST ON OTHER STATIONED FORCES IN THE AREA? A COMMON CEILING WAS NOT SATISFACTORY TO THEM AS IT GAVE THEM NO GUARANTEE THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 00883 010942Z

THE BUDESWEHR WOULD BE REDUCED AND KEPT REDUCED. ONE COULD EASILY IMAGINE THAT AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ONE OF THE SMALLER WESTERN COUNTRIES - HE MENTIONED BELGIUM - WOULD CHOOSE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES FURTHER, THUS CREATING POSSIBILITY FOR AN INCREASE OF THE BUNDESWEHR.

7. ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO ADVANCE THE NEGOTIATIONS

AT THIS STAGE IN PARALLEL WITH THE PLENARIES SMIRNOVSKY DIDN'T COMMIT HIMSELF. THE VARIOUS TYPES OF EMISSARY SYSTEMS WERE DISCUSSED, BUT SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE TIME WAS NOT YET RIPE FOR A CHANGE IN THE METHOD OF NEGOTIATING, SINCE WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH COMMON GROUND TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT. EMISSARIES WOULD JUST STICK TO THEIR INSTRUCTIONS. WHEN LEAVING HE SAID SMILINGLY THAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE 4 PLENARIES A WEEK IN ORDER TO MAKE THE WESTERN SIDE CHANGE THEIR POSITION.

8. ALL DURING THE CONVERSATION SMIRNOVSKY SEEMINGLY MADE AN EFFORT TO STRESS THE GENUINE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT.
END TEXT.HUMES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MBFR, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, MILITARY BUDGET, NEGOTIATIONS, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, COST ESTIMATES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 FEB 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA00883
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740260/aaaacejr.tel
Line Count: 129
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <30 APR 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING OF 31 JANUARY 1974, MEETING BETWEEN DANISH REP KNOX AND SOVIET
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005